Warfare in the Information Age by Sovereign, Michael G.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
1996-06
Warfare in the Information Age
Sovereign, Michael G.
Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology
Proceedings of the 1996 Command and Control Research and Technology
Symposium: Command and Control in the Information Age, p. 141-147
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64690
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
]PJF<O> <C(e(e<dl ii1rn g§ 
<o> if tt]h1 (e 
Jl (9)(9)'6> <9<0> 1onuon1 <e1urn <dl <e1un1 <dl <C<o>lnut1r <0> ll 
Rce§ce.aurdht .aurndl Tcedhtno logry 
§y1•nt lP<Q)§ llllJ[l•nt ( I~%, M D~v'1l('f ';J" 
Cc& cl;') 
Command and Control 
in the 
Information Age 
June 25 - 28, 1996 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
IHI:. CENfliR FOR ADVANCED 
i.=;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;===;;;;;; A (C~ ~====;;;.I 
CONCEPTS AND rlc.P 
Warfare In The Information Age: 
Vision 2010 And Changes In Joint C4 Doctrine 
Michael G. Sovereign 
Professor of Command, Control & Communications 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
Phone: ( 408) 656-2428 
Fax: ( 408) 656-3679 
msovereign@nps.navy.mil 
Abstract 
Technological change is driving toward organ-
izational flexibility and the elimination of 
stovepipes in joint operations. It also is pro-
ducing new sources of vulnerability. This paper 
compares Joint Publication 6-0 "C4 Systems to 
Support Joint Operatives" with the new 
"Warfighting Vision 2010." Both are promul-
gated by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Although they need not be identical, the more 
recent Vision 2010 points out the need to up-
date or re-orient Joint Publication 6-0 even 
though it is only one year old. 
1 Introduction 
The hypothesis that the current Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA) is being driven by the in-
formation technology embodied in new C4I sys-
tems is widely accepted - by those who believe 
that an RMA is indeed occurring. In many re-
spects it may be too soon after the nuclear revolu-
tion to declare that another has begun. And it is 
possi"ble that the silicon revolution will be as much 
a dead end for warfighting as was the nuclear 
revolution. But the U.S. military leadership is 
deeply engaged in exploring this revolution and the 
results may soon be cast into stone through sig-
nillcant investment in new systems and training -
which will require a significant decrease in other 
force structure. This paper identifies some doc-
trinal changes necessary to carry out the RMA 
before we become committed to this path. 
The environment of the U.S. military has sig-
nificantly changed in the last decade. The Gold-
water-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986 was followed by the demise of the Soviet 
Union, the Gulf War, a shrinking defense budget 
and the realization that the loss of its peer com-
petitor may not make life easier for the U.S. mili-
tary. An increasing number of deployments requir-
ing a new focus on providing assistance and sta-
bility are keeping large fractions of the force from 
honing their combat skills and is instead requiring 
a different mind-set. 
At the same time an increasing portion of the 
DoD budget is being spent on C4I systems rather 
than fighting platforms and munitions. These 
trends have disturbed many both inside and outside 
of the military. Do we remain as ready to fight an 
all-out down and dirty war to the death? Probably 
not, but the probability of such an event is also 
much much smaller than the need to execute diffi-
cult missions via strange coalitions in unplanned 
contingencies throughout the world without the 
loss of substantial U.S. forces or even the collat-
eral destruction of those who are present locally 
during the operation. 
To adjust to this very different environment the 
U.S. military has set about developing new joint 
doctrine. Joint doctrine did not previously exist, 
only Service doctrine. The Services remain re-
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sponsi'ble for individual and unit training and doc-
trine. However the emergence of Joint doctrine 
can be a powerful step in bringing common un-
derstanding of the role and activities of the mili-
tary in the next millennium. Here I address in par-
ticular Joint C4 doctrine. 
With regard to command and control in par-
ticular and to C4I systems, doctrine is often en-
tirely overlooked. "Doctrine establishes a par-
ticular way of thinking about war and a way of 
fighting ... doctrine provides a basis for Jzarmoni-
ous actions and mutual understanding, " from the 
Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 quoted in Joint Pub-
lication 1. As such, doctrine provides a substitute 
for some of the need for detailed planning and co-
ordination. Joint doctrine is particularly essential 
in Joint C2 since the amount of time for joint 
trainmg may be quite limited before a joint opera-
tion. Moreover joint doctrine provides the 
authoritative answers to the need for definitions 
that has plagued C2, C3, C4I etc. In addition it 
provides a framework on which all aspects of joint 
operations can be structured, the six top-level 
doctrine Publications: Publication 1-0 on personnel 
and administration, 2-0 on intelligence, 3-0 on op-
erations, 4-0 on logistics, 5-0 plans and 6-0 on C4 
systems. Almost 100 subordinate publications 
detail the doctrine beneath these "above the line" 
publications. A knowledge of these publications 
builds ease of mutual communication within a joint 
force and eases the burden of planning and coordi-
nation. 
Most of this "new" joint doctrine has actually 
been obtained by capturing the existing processes 
of joint operation. New technology introduces 
uncertainties into this capture. New technology 
raises the possi'bility of new operational concepts 
and new organizations as well as new doctrine. In 
this paper we address one particular aspect: 
Command, controL communications and computer 
and Intelligence (C4I) systems. Changes in C4I 
doctrine can greatly change the way joint opera-
tions are organized and performed and vice versa. 
We see a continuing, but productive, tension be-
tween doctrine and innovation and this paper is 
offered in that spirit. I apologize if it sounds criti-
cal of anyone. 
The thinking ofth~ U.S. military leadership as 
to the effect of the new technologies is well ad-
dressed in the Chairman's "Warfighting Vision 
2010," a new document that lays out how the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff believes the 
military should proceed to achieve the RMA 
Technologies have changed the four basic ele-
ments of warfare to allow a much faster, more in-
tense accomplishment of missions. Maneuver has 
become dominating maneuver with ''maneuver by 
fires." Firepower has become precision engage-
ment. C4I will become dominant battlefield 
knowledge and finally logistics will become 
"focused logistics" so that vulnerable in-theatre 
infrastructure will be minimized. This vision has 
great impact on existing joint doctrine. Flatter or-
ganizations will result. Tempo of operations will 
be greatly increased. Forces will be smaller but 
powerfully supported. Most infrastructure will 
remain in CONUS. Joint doctrine must therefore 
be transformed. This raises the question of how 
an RMA will be possible since practically speak-
ing, doctrine can only be changed incrementally. 
A corresponding question concerns whether the 
RMA is supportable by joint doctrine. Perhaps the 
least revolutionary process in the military is how 
we institutionalize change. This paper will analyze 
the changes in Joint Publication 6-0 that may be 
necessary to support the new vision represented by 
the Chairman's "Vision 2010" which is subtitled 
"A Framework for Change." 
2 Role of Doctrine: JCS Publication 6-0 and 
C4I 
According to Joint Publication 1-02, military doc-
trine is defined as: "Fundamental principles by 
which the military forces guide their actions in 
support of national objectives." Guide is a for-
ward-looking verb, not a static one. It indicates a 
willingness, perhaps even duty of doctrine to lead 
change. In this light there should be a correspon-
dence between vision and doctrine. 
The preface of Joint Publication 6-0, which is 
entitled "Doctrine for Command, Control, Com-
munications and Computer (C4) Systems Support 
to Joint Operations," "addresses how C4 systems 
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support the commanders of joint forces in the con-
duct of joint operations including how systems are 
to be configured, deployed and employed." How-
ever, despite the fact that it is "authoritative" the 
preface says "i.t is not the intent to restrict the 
authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from 
engaging and executing the mission in a manner 
the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of 
effort in the accomplishment of the overall mis-
sion." Doctrine is not a strait jacket. 
Exactly what does Publication 6-0 say authori-
tatively. - only a small (but perhaps important) 
amount in my opinion. As is often the case, what 
is not said may be more significant - as will be de-
tailed in the remainder of the paper. 
A quick review of Publication 6-0 can start 
with the executive summary which is sub-entitled 
Commanders Overview which is outlined as shown 
in Table 1. It is also essentially a table of contents 
for the Publication 6-0. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW 
• Descnocs the Role of Command, Control, Commim-
icatiCIIS, and Computer (C4) Systems 
• Outlines Objectives and Compwents 
• Provides Basic C4 Systems Principles 
• Explains C4 Systems Carligurat.iw and Infrastructure 
• Disrusses the Planning Process and Employment Re-
spCllSlbilities 
• Outlines Joint and Multinat.iwal Standardizatiw and 
Procedures 
• Covers the Global C4 Infrastructure 
Table 1 
The fourth sentence of the Executive Summary 
says in bold face regarding the role of C4 systems: 
''The JFC controls the command and control sup-
port systems (C2S) to ensure that data and infor-
mation get to the right place on time." This seems 
to equate C4 with logistics-moving bits instead of 
boxes. The first figure of Publication 6-0, also 
shown here as Figure 1 reinforces this philosophy 
which seems to be far afield from the "C4I for the 
Warrior" spirit that one might have expected 
would be highlighted, especially in the 
"Commanders Overview." Note also that Figure 1 
is not a cybernetic loop, a concept which occurs 
nowhere in Publication 6-0 even though it is per-
haps the single most important concept in C3 re-
search. Figure I-1 of Publication 6-0 is indeed C2 
support system centric rather than ''warrior cen-
tric." It indicates no hierarchy of command or lat-
eral coordination. On the other hand it does not 
over emphasize communication, a common fault 
seen for example in Figure II-1 which represents a 
C4 system by a Basic Communications System 

















The four fundamental objectives of C4 systems 
occur next. These are shown as Figure 2 here al-
though they are in Figure 1-6 in Publication 6-0. 
The first two objectives are more closely tied to 
warfighting than the preceding material and are 
:fully in keeping with Vision 2010. The third is 




• Produce Unity of Effort 
• Exploit tct.al Farce Capabilities 
• Properly Positiw Critical Infan:nat.iw 
• Infan:nat.icn Fusiw 
Figure 2 
For some reason the Executive Summary then 
skips over one of the most directive sections of 
Publication 6-0 "Basic Doctrine for C4 Systems" 
which appears on page I-7. The boldface text of 
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this section is reproduced here as Table 2 because 
I consider it a most important section. It estab-
lishes responsi"bilities for the performance of the 




C4 systems must provide the rapid, reliable, and secure flow and 
processing of data to ensure ccntinuous :infonnatioo exdiange 
throughout the force. 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff msures that command-
ers at each ec:heloo have the COlillllUillcatiOOS necessary to ac-
compfuh their assigned missicns. 
C4 systems provided to combataot commanders q,erate under 
their authority and will be an integral part of their C2 :infrastruc-
ture 
JFCs lllllSt develop operaticnal procedures that provide interoper-
able, compatible, C4 networks. 
The complexity of joint q,eratic:ns and the finite amount of C4 re-
sources may require the JFC to adjudicate or assign subordinate 
command r~=bilities for providing C4 systems support. 
Table2 
The Executive Summary then proceeds to dis-
cuss C4 Principles which are shown here as Figure 
3. In contrast, Vision 2010 presents the 
''Principles of War" which are closer to the first 
two C4 Objectives than to these "nice to have" C4 
Principles which are mostly characteristics rather 
than principles. A comparison of these 3 lists of 
principles is shown as Figure 4. It can be seen that 
both Security and Simplicity from the Principles of 
War find no obvious counterparts in either the C4 
Principles or C4 Objectives, nor does either idea 
intrude upon the Commanders Overview (ES)! 
Upon careful reading of the main body of Publica-
tion 6-0 one finds that there is a page, Il-8, of the 
sub-principles of both security and information 
protection with reference to a Command and 
Control Warfare (C2W) framework. C2W is de-
fined in the glossary but it is discussed only on 
page Il-8 and with regard only to the protective 
mission, not offensive. Nor is Information War 














• Produce Urity of Effort 
• Exploit Total Force Capabilities 
• Properly Positioo. Critical Informatioo. 
• Infonnatioo. Fusicn 
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Maneuver 






,___ • Jnterq,erable 
- • Flexible 
- • R~CllSive 
• Mobile 




The Executive Summary goes from principles 
to employment and configurations which are cov-
ered in detail in Chapter ID. Somehow it skips 
what are labeled the "mandatory" capabilities of 
Figure 5 which appears in the text as Figure ill-1. 
Interoperability is highlighted in the Executive 
Summary as seen in Table 3 here. Chapter IV on 
Employment Responsibilities even provide direc-
tion that the combatant commanders report 
"incompatibilities and lack of interoperability'' to 
the Chairman, but it does not charge him with 
eliminating them It does require the military de-
partments ''to provide interoperable and compati-
ble C4 systems, war.fighters and reserves of 
equipment and supplies as well as mobile, trans-
portable C4 system assets." However most of 
Chapter 4 is nondirective descriptions of the 
Service C4 organizations and systems. It is largely 
interesting pedagogical material but not essential 
to joint doctrine. 
MANDATORY C4 
CAPABILITIES 
Support activities across the range of military op-
erations 
Support a smooth, orderly transition from peace to 
war 
Monitor and assess the status ofUS, multina-
tional, neutral, and enemy forces and resources 
Provide for the collection, processing, transmis-
sion, and dissemination of data and products 
Provide warning and attack assessment, and dis-
seminate alert notification 
Monitor the execution of selected options 
Provide for the tracking, control, and reporting of 
reinforcing forces and materiel 
Support reconstitution and resource allocation 
Support transition from hostilities to peace 
Protect systems/networks through C4 defensive 
measures 
Figure 5 
The stovepipes of intelligence and C4 are 
maintained, perhaps even enthroned, in Publication 
?-0. D~ is made responsible for "developing, 
unplementmg and managing the configuration of 
information, data and communications for intelli-
gence systems," while DISA is responsiole for 
meeting the worldwide network and telecommuni-
cations requirements and GCCS. A major point of 
Vision 2010 is that it addresses C4 I in a com-
pletely integrated context. Joint doctrine will 
eventually have to address this. 
The last point in the Executive Summary and in 
the last chapter cover the Global C4 Infrastructure 
at an abstract level It also mentions the Global 
Command and Control System (GCCS) for the 
first time since the Principles chapter's section on 
decision support systems. 
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C4 Systems Configuration 
The C4 systems of the combatant 
commanders, Military Departments 
and Services are configured and 
operated to meet the necessary 
requirements of interoperability 
and the individual commands. 
The C4 systems of the combatant commands are ccmigured 
and operated generally to meet the requirements of interoperability 
and the command being served; however, the priority requirement 
will be to support the Naticnal Military Command System 
(NMCS). These systems provide the means throueµ which the 
commanders send and receive informatim and exercise command 
and cmtrol over their forces. 
The C4 systems of the Service component commands are 
ccnfigured and operated generally to meet the requireml'Dt of in-
teroperability and the command being served; however, the prior-
ity requirement will be to support the NMCS. These systems 
provide the means throueµ which the commanders send and re-
ceive informatim and support their forces. 
The C4 systems o(the Military Departments and Services are 
ccnfigured and operated generally to meet the requirements of in-
teroperability and of individual Service commands and the re-
qwreml'Dt to provide serviceable wartime capabilities that can 
support existing forces logistically, generate new forces e&ablish 
force readiness levels adequate to deal with existing threats, and 
provide support for the NMCS. These syrums facilitate coordi-
natim of the means by which US forces are sustained across the 
range of military operatiOllS. 
The C4 support systems of Department of Defense (DOD) 
agencies are cccligured generally to meet the requirements of in-
teroperability and the agency being served; however, the priority 
requirement will be to support the NMCS. These systems provide 
the means throueµ which the directors cootrol the automated flow 
and processing of informatim needed to accomplish the mis&ccs 
of their agencies. 
Table3 
In summary, only a small fraction of Publication 
6-0 is directive. Largely it contains descriptive 
material that may widen the understanding of how 
the Services do their business but gives little guid-
ance on insight or support as to how the CINCs 
perform their war.fighting tasks. A refocusing to-
ward CINCs and JTFs, the joint warfighters, 1s 
needed. 
3 The Chairman's Warfighting Vision 2010 vs 
the Doctrine of Joint Publication 6-0 
The Chairman's Vision 2010 is subtitled 
"Framework for Change." It is a document look-
ing to the future and should not necessarily be 
identical to how the military "guides it actions" 
today - but doctrine is forward looking as well -
certainly not all of even the "authoritative" and 
"mandatory" guidance in Publication 6-0 is met 
today. Even so, there are large differences be-
tween the views of Vision 2010 which is about to 
be signed out, and those of Publication 6-0 dated 
May 30, 1995. Both documents are products of 
the same organization, the Joint W arfighting 
Center, which acts for J-7 regarding doctrine and 
also for the drafting of the Vision 2010. The 
Chairman promulgates both documents. 
Does doctrine lead or codify? In the case of 
Publication 6-0, it lags at present in the compari-
son to Vision 2010. The purpose of Vision 2010 
is to "present a coherent analysis of the future 
trends in warfare." It is "more than a technology 
piece." The technologies provide a fused, real-
time representation of the battlespace, an ability to 
order, respond and coordinate." "Battlespace 
awareness combined with high-speed C4I and ex-
tremely accurate survivable and lethal precision 
strike implies that a synergetic whole is created 
that is greater than the sum of its parts." Note the 
integration of C4 and Intelligence here which oc-
curs throughout Vision 2010. 
"Improvements in sensors, operational con-
cepts and organizational structures make it possi-
ble to achieve real-time, all-weather continuous 
surveillance .. . " "The technologies allow us to 
focus on knowledge-based warfighting who 
knows what, when, where and why. It forms the 
basis for Information Warfare (IW). 1W meaps 
disrupting, or destroying, the information systems 
an adversary relies on to "know itself' - who it is, 
where it is, what it can do when, why it is fighting 
and which threats to counter first." All of the 
above quotations occur by page 2 in my version. 
Already we can see the principal deficiency in 
Publication 6-0. It completely lacks the aggres-
sive approach of Vision 2010 and contents itself 
with running an information system, but to what 
end? Moreover it maintains the fragmentation of 
C4 and Intelligence. It lacks any mechanism for 
tight real-time control of the total C4I system - no 
one is in charge and there are no systems for 
keeping track of the status of our own C4I vice 
that of the enemy. We can't even tell if we are 
under attack, much less if we are winning the IW! 
One of the major points of Vision 2010 is that 
enhanced C4I will be an enabler of the emerging 
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deterrent capabilities: dominant maneuver and 
precision strike/operations and full spectrum 
dominance. Figure 6 from Vision 2010 reflects 
this relationship. Enhanced C4I "will (1) handle 
all the data provided by the expansion of sensors; 
(2) access and sort the important; and, (3) transfer 
the information necessary to engage these targets 
successfully to the weapons and forces best suited 
for the engagement. This process involves nodal 
analysis at the strategic, operational and tactical 
levels and could well be an Achilles' Heel." 
FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE 
Communications 






This concept does have a minor counterpart in 
JCS Publication 6-0. Although not referred to in 
the Executive Summary, Figure II-4, reproduced 
here as Figure 7, is the "GRID" - which is a com-
munications concept that could support a real-time 
common operational picture, an important C4I for 
the Warrior product which is almost invisible in 
Publication 6-0. That would lead to the integra-
tion of Intelligence with C4. This concept how-
ever requires another integration of stovepipes, 
that of C4I with combat direction (fire control) 
systems. Such an integration is necessary to allow 
targeting quality information to be available 
widely. The Navy has recently taken on this 
The Vision 2010 notes that some of the tech-
nologies that will produce Enhanced C4I are 
Automatic Target Recognition (ATR), Artificial 
Intelligence (AI), Multi-Level Security (MLS), and 
Data Compression (DC). These are not mentioned 
in JCS Publication 6-0! Vision 2010 notes ''It is 
entirely posSiole for a satellite ... detecting a ballis-
tic missile launch, could trigger an AI targeting 
subroutine to target a cruise missile in flight and 
provide it with real-time updates to enable the de-
struction of the mobile launch vehicle." Here is a 
powerful deterrence concept which challenges 
Publication 6-0 doctrinally, organizationally, and 
technically. 
Most important of all is the need for addressing 
organizational change to best use the new tech-
nologies to achieve Full Spectrum Dominance. 
Vision 2010 states that ''In the future the require-
ments of the battlespace may make traditional hi-
erarchical command and control arrangements ob-
solescent. With increased real-time knowledge 
from the sensor-to-shooter there is a great poten-
tial to flatten the organizational structure. These 
capabilities enable greater decentraliz.ation through 
information technology, growth of distributed 
systems and establishment of virtual organiza-
tions." There is no hint of these changes in Publi-
cation 6-0, nor does Publication 3-0 cover the de-
ficiencies. Vision 2010 states ''Technological en-
hancement may have made "control" an anathema 
to "command" C2 may have to give way to an ex-
clusion on consultation and coordination. This 
allows commanders at all levels to operate with 
greater latitude and autonomy as part of an inte-
grated joint operation." Both PACOM and 
ACOM are changing their organizational struc-
tures and the Marine Corps is considering setting 
up permanent ITF PAC and ITF LANTs to enable 
flattened, more collaborative headquarters actions. 
Certainly there are implications for Publication 6-0 
that should be addressed in the next version. 
It is of course unfair to expect that the first is-
suance of Publication 6-0 would look into the fu-
ture as far as a ''Vision" document. But I think 
that it is clear that a revision is necessary within 
the next several years. Such an update must take 
into account: 
1. Integration across stovepipes C4, I, and 
Combat Direction System (CDS); 
2. Information War 
3. Changing joint organizations to be more 
fle,a'ble and adaptive .. 
Publication 6-0 does have one area of C4 for 
which it says someone is in charge - nuclear op-
erations and their C4. We need to similarly specify 
responsibilities for enhanced C4I to support the 
future joint military operations. 
The Joint Warfighting Center has been tasked 
by the Chairman with the implementation of Vision 
2010. Since they also prepare the Joint Doctrine 
documents we can look forward to a harmoniza-
tion of JCS Publication 6-0 with Vision 2010. 
There will always remain a useful tension between 
today's doctrine and visionary statements. To-
day's paper is, I hope, a step forward in the dialog 
to maintain that constructive tension. 
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